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THE FIRST AMENDMENT CASE AGAINST
PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING
Emmet J. Bondurant II and Ben W. Thorpe*
The Supreme Court recognizes that "[p]artisan
gerrymanders... [are incompatible] with democratic
principles."I This makes good sense. The fundamental
objective of redistrictingis to "establish'fairand effective
And partisan
representation for all citizens. '2
gerrymandering-whichthe Supreme Court defines as
"drawing... district lines to subordinate adherents of
one political party and entrench a rival party in
power'--runs counter to that fundamental objective.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has yet to invalidate
a redistricting plan solely as an unconstitutional
partisan gerrymander. This Symposium issue of the
Georgia Law Review, however, comes at a crucial
moment in the Court's treatment of that question. A case
now before the Supreme Court presents the Court with
the opportunity to set limits on this anti-democratic
practice and to clarify the constitutional bases for those
limits. While a number of legal arguments for reining
in partisangerrymanderingare now before the Supreme
Court, this Article focuses on just one of those claims.
In the authors' view, the First Amendment provides
clear legal standards under which courts may properly
invalidate district lines-and, accordingly, districting
plans-that have been drawn to subordinate the
adherentsof one politicalparty in favor of the views and
electoralpreferences of the party in power. This Article
Emmet J. Bondurant II is a founding partner of Bondurant, Mixson & Elmore LLP. Ben
W. Thorpe is an associate at Bondurant, Mixson & Elmore LLP. Both are proud graduates
of the University of Georgia School of Law.
1 Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658
(2015) (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 292 (2004) (plurality opinion)).
2 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 307 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 565-68 (1964)).
3 Ariz. Indep. RedistrictingComm'n, 135 S. Ct. at 2658.
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argues that these standardsare legal rules the Court has
applied in a variety of contexts and that the application
of such rules does not require the Court to derive any
additional metric or metrics by which to adjudicate
these claims.
The factual record in two cases recently before the
Supreme Court may have supported the application of
these standards to invalidate the challenged districts
and districting plans at issue-the Wisconsin state
legislative map and Maryland's Sixth Congressional
District. For a number of reasons beyond the scope of
this Article, the Court remanded both of those cases
absent any holding as to the merits of a First
Amendment claim.
The constitutionality of North Carolina's 2016
Congressional Plan, however, now finds itselffollowing remand and reconsideration by the district
court-squarely before the Supreme Court on appeal.
Because that challenge now looks to present the next
opportunity for the Court to consider these issues, and
because of their involvement in the North Carolina
litigation, the authors focus principal attention on
application of the underlying law to that congressional
redistrictingplan and its individual districts.
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I. WHY THE FIRST AMENDMENT FOR PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING?

A full treatment of the history of partisan gerrymandering claims
at the Supreme Court is beyond the scope of this Article. For our
purposes, it suffices to acknowledge that beginning in 1986-with
Davis v. Bandemer-partisan gerrymandering claims have been
regarded as justiciable. 4 That is not to say, however, that plaintiffs
have precisely understood the terms under which they might
prevail. Overwhelmingly, the cases that have made their way to the
Supreme Court (or that have been adjudicated favorably to
defendants in lower courts and then summarily affirmed) have
been-like Bandemer-equalprotection challenges brought against
statewide redistricting plans.
One such case-Vieth v. Jubelirer-madeits way to the Supreme
Court in 2004. In Vieth, a four-Justice plurality opinion (authored
by Justice Scalia) held that partisan gerrymandering claims are
simply non-justiciable-that no manageable standards exist for
adjudicating such claims, and that none could or will be
determined. 5 That opinion, however, did not control. Though
Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment that the Vieth plaintiffs
presented no such standard, he struck a more optimistic tone
regarding the possibility of such claims. 6 Four justices dissented
from the plurality's holding, presenting their own standards by
which to evaluate the claims in Vieth and other cases, 7 thereby
making Justice Kennedy's opinion controlling as to the ongoing
justiciability of partisan gerrymandering claims.

4 See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 118-27 (1986) (addressing the justiciability of
partisan gerrymandering claims and holding that such claims are justiciable); League of
United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), 548 U.S. 399, 413-14 (2006) (discussing
Bandemer'sjusticiability holding and electing not to revisit it).
See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 281 ("[N]o judicially discernible and manageable standards for
adjudicating political gerrymandering claims have emerged. Lacking them, we must
conclude that political gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable and that Bandemer was
wrongly decided.").
6 See id. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("I would not foreclose all possibility of judicial
relief if some limited and precise rationale were found to correct an established violation of
the Constitution in some redistricting cases.").
7 See, e.g., id. at 339 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[I]n evaluating a challenge to a specific
district, I would apply the standard set forth in the [racial gerrymandering] cases and ask
whether the legislature allowed partisan considerations to dominate and control the lines
drawn, forsaking all neutral principles."); id. at 347-51 (Souter, J., dissenting) (articulating
a five-element prima facie case); id. at 365-67 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (focusing on "indicia of
abuse").
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That critical fifth vote regarding justiciability was not Justice
Kennedy's sole contribution in Vieth, however. Critically, and
highly relevant to litigation now before the Supreme Court, he
offered the view that "[t]he First Amendment may be the more
relevant constitutional provision in future cases that allege
unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering."8 Elaborating on that
claim, he explained that "these allegations involve the First
Amendment interest of not burdening or penalizing citizens because
of their participation in the electoral process, their voting history,
their association with a political party, or their expression of
political views." 9
Further, Justice Kennedy preempted several possible objections
to a First Amendment approach contained in Justice Scalia's
Justice Scalia maintained that "a First
plurality opinion.
Amendment claim ...would render unlawful all consideration of
political affiliation in districting, just as it renders unlawful all
consideration of political affiliation" in the patronage cases, which
"' 10 Not so, Justice
require "that political affiliation be disregarded.
Kennedy responded, writing that this "misrepresent[ed] the First
"The
Amendment analysis" he proposed as an alternative.1 1
inquiry is not whether political classifications were used. The
inquiry instead is whether political classifications were used to
burden a group's representational rights."12 Justice Kennedy then
grafted that analysis onto a familiar First Amendment framework:
"If a court were to find that a State did impose burdens and
restrictions on groups or persons by reason of their views, there
would likely be a First Amendment violation, unless the State
13
shows some compelling interest."
It is this language of "burden" that has given rise to much of the
current dispute over judicially manageable standards for
adjudicating partisan gerrymandering claims under the First
Amendment. As Justice Kennedy recognized in Vieth, "courts must
be cautious about adopting a standard that turns on whether the
partisan interests in the redistricting process were excessive.

8 Id. at 314 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

9 Id. (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (plurality opinion)).
10 Id. at 294 (plurality opinion).

11 Id. at 315 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
12

Id.

13 Id.
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Excessiveness is not easily determined." 14 To illustrate the point,
Justice Kennedy gave two examples. In the first example, an
"egregious" gerrymander captures every congressional seat for a
single party.15
In the second, a more subtle gerrymander
engineered by Party Y nonetheless ensures that Party Y will
capture more seats than Party X.16 In Justice Kennedy's view-as
17
expressed in Vieth-"each is culpable."
Two years after Vieth, however, Justice Kennedy authored the
majority opinion in League of United Latin American Citizens v.
Perry (LULAC). 18
In LULAC, the Court held that plaintiffs
challenging a voluntary, mid-decade redistricting-the sole purpose
of which was allegedly partisan gain-had not resolved the
unworkability of the claim presented in Vieth. 19 As Justice Kennedy
then wrote, "a successful claim attempting to identify
unconstitutional acts of partisan gerrymandering must do what
appellants' sole-motivation theory explicitly disavows: show a
burden, as measured by a reliable standard, on the complainants'
20
representational rights."
Without question, many political scientists and partisan
gerrymandering plaintiffs have viewed this phrase-"measured by
a reliable standard"-as a challenge. 21 Justice Kennedy must, goes
the argument, be asking plaintiffs to devise a metric by which the
effect of the gerrymander can be shown as a matter of reliable
evidence, and this metric (or the legal rule requiring some showing
to which the metric is tailored) may form the basis of judicially
manageable standards for adjudicating partisan gerrymandering

14

Id.

15

Id.

16

Id.

17

Id.

at 316.

548 U.S. 399 (2006).
19 Id. at 423.
20 Id. at 418.
21 See, e.g., Michael S. Kang, When Courts Won't Make Law: PartisanGerrymanderingand
a StructuralApproach to the Law of Democracy, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1097, 1111 (2007) ("Justice
Kennedy's ambivalence leaves it bizarrely unclear where the law of partisan gerrymandering
stands.").
18
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claims. 22 Such an approach is well-developed in the literature and
23
in the courts and may prove to have merit.
This Article argues, however, that the quest for a reliable metric
has in certain ways obscured the simplicity and coherence of Justice
Kennedy's approach as outlined in his Vieth concurrence. Moreover,
and quite unlike equal-protection jurisprudence during the same
fourteen-year window since Vieth was decided, the Supreme Court's
First Amendment jurisprudence has only grown more robust in its
protection of First Amendment rights. Before surveying the
applicable First Amendment law and applying it-as a recent threejudge district court in North Carolina did-to the 2016 North
Carolina congressional redistricting, we note one additional feature
that draws us to the First Amendment as a relevant and practical
source of law for adjudicating these claims.
One of Justice Scalia's final opinions evaluated a partisan
gerrymandering claim arising from the alleged targeting of
Republican voters and a Republican candidate by Democrats then
in control of Maryland's congressional redistricting. 24 This claim
had been brought under the First Amendment and specifically to
test the viability of Justice Kennedy's approach in Vieth. 25 But the
case presented the Supreme Court with only a narrow procedural
issue: had the district court (and, subsequently, Fourth Circuit)
erred in failing to direct that the claim be adjudicated by a threejudge district court as required for apportionment cases? 26 In
reversing the decision below, Justice Scalia's majority opinion
quoted Justice Kennedy's Vieth concurrence, reviving the plaintiffs'
claims based on "on a legal theory put forward by a Justice of this
22 See, e.g., James A. Gardner, A Post-Vieth Strategy for Litigating Partisan
Gerrymandering Claims, 3 ELECTION L.J. 643, 643 (2004) ("Vieth thus appears to resolve
nothing, while inviting litigants to continue bringing what have proven uniformly to be
fruitless actions in the hope of stumbling blindly upon some legal standard that might supply
the as-yet unknown incantation necessary to evoke judicial relief.").
23 Indeed, one such case was argued before the Supreme Court in its most recent term.
Despite extensive discussion at oral argument regarding plaintiffs' attempts to develop a
workable standard by which partisan gerrymandering claims of vote dilution may be
adjudicated, the opinion in Gill v. Whitford-the challenge to the Wisconsin legislative
districts-was ultimately quite narrow. 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1933-34 (2018). Plaintiffs had
pleaded and argued a statewide theory of injury for which the Court found no Article III
standing. The Court remanded, holding that the harm of vote dilution need be shown on a
district-by-district basis.
? Shapiro v. McManus, 136 S. Ct. 450, 453 (2015).
25 See id. at 456 (noting that the complaint specifically called upon Justice Kennedy's
suggested First Amendment theory in Vieth).
26 Id. at 454.
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Court" that is "uncontradicted by the majority in any of our cases. '27
That case, having been amended and further developed before a
three-judge district court following remand by the Supreme Court,
returned to the Supreme Court after the denial of a preliminary
injunction sought by plaintiffs, but again escaped review on the
merits. It is now back before the Supreme Court for review on the
28
merits.
II. RELEVANT FIRST AMENDMENT LAW
"Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of
speech. '29 Accordingly, and as applied also to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment, the First Amendment prohibits the
government from "prescrib[ing] what shall be orthodox in politics." 30
It subjects to strict scrutiny content-based laws that "restrict
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or
its content." 31 As the Supreme Court has repeatedly made clear, the
rights to join a political party and to support candidates of one's
choice are "core ...activities protected by the First Amendment." 32
These associational rights, of course, relate closely to the right of
voters, "regardless of their political persuasion, to cast their votes
33
effectively."
Nor are these the only relevant restrictions imposed on
government by the First Amendment. The Supreme Court has long
held that "[c]ontent-based laws-[laws] that target speech based on
its communicative content-are presumptively unconstitutional
[under the First Amendment] and may be justified only if the
government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve

21 Id. at 456.
28 Benisek v. Lamone, 138 S. Ct. 1942, 1943, 201 L. Ed. 2d 398 (2018); see also Shapiro v.
McManus, 203 F. Supp. 3d 579, 596 (D. Md. 2016) ("[W]ell-established First Amendment
jurisprudence... provides a well-understood... discernible and manageable standard.").
29 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
30
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
31
Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
32
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 356 (1976); see also Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 136 S.
Ct. 1412, 1416 (2016) ("The First Amendment generally prohibits government officials from
dismissing or demoting an employee because of the employee's engagement in
constitutionally protected political activity.").
33 Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 787 (1983) (emphasis added) (quoting Williams
v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30-31 (1968)).

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol52/iss4/3
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compelling state interests."3 4 This is so even where the law as
written itself is "content neutral."35 Even "facially content neutral"
statutes may operate on content-based distinctions that warrant
heightened scrutiny.3 6 "Laws of this sort pose the inherent risk that
the Government seeks not to advance a legitimate regulatory goal,
but to suppress unpopular ideas or information or manipulate the
public debate through coercion rather than persuasion." 37 And the
Supreme Court has "long recognized that even regulations aimed at
proper

governmental

concerns

can

restrict

unduly... rights

38
protected by the First Amendment."
Further, First Amendment law sets clear and fast limits on
among
"[D]iscrimination
discrimination.
viewpoint
viewpoints... based on 'the specific motivating ideology or the

opinion or perspective'

. . .

is a 'more blatant' and 'egregious form of

content discrimination"' that violates the most basic principle of the
First Amendment. 39 The unique "danger" of such viewpoint
discrimination "is that the government is attempting to [suppress]
certain ideas or perspectives" and thereby skew the "free and open
discussion in a democratic society."40 As applied particularly to
partisan viewpoints, the First Amendment prohibits government
from exercising its "discretion ...
41
manner."

in a narrowly partisan or political

The Supreme Court has been remarkably clear in applying this
rule-for decades-in the context of improper partisanship. Indeed,
the core principle underlying the Court's patronage cases is simple.
3
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015) (first citing R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505
U.S. 377, 395 (1992); then citing Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime
Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 115, 118 (1991)); see also United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709,
716-17 (2012) ("The Constitution 'demands that content-based restrictions ... be presumed
invalid . . . and that the Government bear the burden of showing their constitutionality."
(third alteration in original) (quoting Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 660
(2004))).
35 Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2230.
36 Id. at 2227.
37 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994).
38 Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 592 (1983)
(citing Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939)).
39 Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2230 (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515
U.S. 819, 829 (1995)).
40 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1767, 1769 (2017) (Kennedy, J. concurring).
41 Bd. of Educ. v. Pico ex rel. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 870 (1982) (plurality opinion). The Court
added, "Ifa Democratic school board, motivated by party affiliation, ordered the removal of
all books written by or in favor of Republicans, few would doubt that the order violated the
[First Amendment] rights of the students denied access to those books." Id. at 870-71.
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"To the [electoral] victor belong only those spoils that may be
constitutionally obtained.."42 Because the government may not
appoint itself the arbiter of preferred or disfavored speech by
individuals, governments may not then "discharge or threaten to
discharge public employees solely for not being supporters of the
political party in power." 43
Nor may decisions regarding
"promotion, transfer, recall, and hiring.., involving low-level public
employees... be constitutionally based on party affiliation and
44
support."
Viewpoint discrimination is itself an injury to the First
Amendment rights of the intended targets or victims. As applied in
the patronage context, discrimination on the basis of targeted
political views may "starve political opposition," and "tip[] the
electoral process in favor of the incumbent party. ' 45 But it is not
merely the possible effect of such discrimination that matters here.
Governmentally sanctioned favor or disfavor of protected expression
is limited by the First Amendment. 46 In short, motives matter, as
do the mechanisms by which the official favor or disfavor operate,
42 Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 64 (1990).
43 Id.

4 Id. at 65.
45 Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 356 (1976) (plurality opinion); see also Benisek v. Lamone,
266 F. Supp. 3d 799, 818 (D. Md.) (Niemayer, J., dissenting), appeal docketed, 138 S. Ct. 543
(2017) ("[W]hen district mapdrawers target voters based on their prior, constitutionally
protected expression in voting and dilute their votes, the conduct violates the First
Amendment, effectively punishing voters for the content of their voting practices.").
46 'The principal inquiry in determining content neutrality [under the First
Amendment] ... is whether the government has adopted a regulation.. . because of
disagreement with the message [the speech] conveys. The government's purpose is the
controlling consideration." Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (emphasis
added) (citing Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 295 (1984)); see also
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995) ("In the realm of
private speech or expression, government regulation may not favor one speaker over another.');
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 543 (1993) ('The
principle that government, in pursuit of legitimate interests, cannot in a selective manner
impose burdens only on conduct motivated by religious belief is essential to the protection of the
rights guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause. The principle underlying the general
applicability requirement has parallels in our First Amendment jurisprudence."); Michael S.
Kang, Gerrymanderingand the Constitutional Norm Against Government Partisanship,116
MICH. L. REV. 351, 376 (2017) ("Where the Constitution regulates the law of democracy, courts
often have acted to cut off official government partisanship, irrespective of how extreme or
moderate the partisanship . . . . ); Justin Levitt, Intent" is Enough: Invidious Partisanshipin

Redistricting, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1993, 2014 (2018) ("[T]he desire to punish or subordinate
members of an opposing partisan clan because of their political affiliation is also an invidious
and legally suspect motivation for public action.").
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without respect to the ultimate result of the improper governmental
47
action.
But First Amendment law also provides ample standards for
evaluating the discriminatory effect of such impermissible targeting
of particular viewpoints. As in many contexts, a particular result is
not required in the redistricting context. The entire point of
redistricting for partisan advantage is to ensure the playing field is
not level. Denial of the opportunity to compete is the injury. The
Court's clear precedent regarding the conferral of benefits
illustrates the infirmity of such a governmental purpose:
As [the Supreme Court has] said: "[I]f the government
could deny a benefit to a person because of his
constitutionally protected speech or associations, his
exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized
and inhibited. This would allow the government to
'produce a result which [it] could not command directly.'
Such interference with constitutional rights is
''
impermissible. 48
Yet that is precisely the form of interference with First
Amendment-protected expression that partisan gerrymanders
47 See Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 136 S. Ct. 1412, 1418 (2016) ("We conclude
that.., the government's reason for demoting Heffernan is what counts here. When an
employer demotes an employee out of a desire to prevent the employee from engaging in
political activity that the First Amendment protects, the employee is entitled to challenge
that unlawful action under the First Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983-even if, as here, the
employer makes a factual mistake about the employee's behavior. We note that a rule of law
finding liability in these circumstances tracks the language of the First Amendment more
closely than would a contrary rule."); Benisek v. Lamone, 266 F. Supp. 3d at 818-19
(Niemeyer, J., dissenting) ('The harm is not found in any particular election statistic, nor
even in the outcome of an election, but instead on the intentional and targeted burdening of
the effective exercise of a First Amendment representational right.").
48 O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 717 (1996) (second and third
alterations in original) (quoting Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)); see also
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 793-94 (1983) (finding that Anderson had standing to
challenge a state ballot-access statute that deprived him of the opportunity to run as an
independent candidate in a presidential primary, without having to prove that he would have
won); Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 965 (1982) (holding that third-party candidates had
standing to challenge statutes or regulations that deprived them of the opportunity to run for
or to be appointed to a public office, without having to prove that they would have been
chosen); Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 364 (1970) (allowing those without real property to
bring suit challenging a requirement that government officeholders own free property,
without needing to prove their chances of winning); Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95, 103 (1989)
(reaffirming Turner).
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explicitly deploy. Because it cannot produce the result directly, the
party in power determines the desired partisan result and draws
district lines accordingly. Though such outcomes once may have
stood beyond the reach of mapdrawers, the effects of such partisan
control of the mapdrawing process have become remarkably clear in
this most recent decade. The time has come for the Supreme Court
to apply its well-settled First Amendment precedents in the
redistricting context.
III. APPLICATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO CLAIMS OF
UNCONSTITUTIONAL PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING: THE NORTH
CAROLINA EXAMPLE

The recent invalidation of North Carolina's 2016 Congressional
Plan (2016 Plan) on First Amendment grounds (among others)
provides a model by which the Supreme Court may apply settled
First Amendment standards to adjudicate partisan gerrymandering
claims. Partisan gerrymandering is intentional discrimination by a
state against members of a political party based on "their
participation in the electoral process, their voting history, their
association with a political party, or their expression of political
views."49 In all other contexts, the Court has held that "those
burdens... are unconstitutional."50 While the Supreme Court has
not yet actually applied First Amendment analysis to a partisan
gerrymandering claim, Justice Kennedy's First Amendment
theory-first articulated in Vieth-remains "uncontradicted by the
majority in any [of the Court's] cases." 5 1
The 2016 Plan-by the explicit written criteria used to draw its
districts and the admissions of those responsible for the mapprescribed the partisan effect the party in power intended the plan
to yield. In two separate cases consolidated for discovery and trial,
plaintiffs challenging that plan alleged that the 2016 Plan favored
voters of the party in power (Republicans) and burdened or
penalized voters of a disfavored party (Democrats) based on the
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 314 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id.; see also Kang, supra note 46, at 352 ("What goes forgotten is how little support there
is elsewhere in constitutional law, beyond Vieth, for Justice Scalia's proposition that the
government can engage in purposeful partisan discrimination at all.").
r1 Shapiro v. McManus, 136 S. Ct. 450, 456 (2015).
49
5o
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content of those voters' protected political expression. 52 Those
responsible for the 2016 Plan used plaintiffs' voting histories and
political affiliations to assign them to districts where the
effectiveness of their votes would be diluted or nullified. 53 And,
plaintiffs argued, the 2016 Plan in fact burdened the voters it was
intended to burden. Despite earning only 53% of votes cast in 2016
North Carolina congressional elections, Republicans captured ten of
thirteen congressional seats, a 77% share. 54 Defendants achieved
their stated objective of "maintain[ing] the [ten Republican and
three Democrat] partisan makeup of North Carolina's congressional
delegation," using political data to ensure electoral outcomes
55
favoring the party in power and penalizing the disfavored party.
Both sets of plaintiffs-advancing slightly different legal theories56
argued that this violated the First Amendment.
After extensive discovery, a full trial, a comprehensive opinion
issued in January 2018, a stay almost immediately issued by the
Supreme Court, remand by the Supreme Court following its
decision in Gill v. Whitford, and supplemental briefing by the
parties, the three-judge district court majority agreed. 57 In support
of its First Amendment holding, the district court made a number
of relevant factual findings. First, the district court noted that
Representative David Lewis, the Republican co-chair of the Joint
Committee responsible for the 2016 Plan and the author of the
Adopted Criteria governing the plan, told the committee that the
Adopted Criteria "contemplate [s] looking at the political
data.., and as you draw the lines, if you're trying to give a partisan
advantage, you would want to draw lines so that more of the whole
[voter districts] voted for the Republican on the ballot than they did
As the district court further noted,
[for] the Democrat."5 8
"[Representative Lewis] explained that 'to the extent [we] are going
to use political data in drawing th[e] map, it is to gain partisan
advantage.' [He also] 'acknowledge[d] freely that this would be a

52

Common Cause v. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d 777, 799 (M.D.N.C. 2018).

53 Id at 801.
54

Id. at 810.

55 See id. at 807 (citation omitted) (reproducing the districting criteria utilized by the

legislative defendants).
5 Id. at 810.
57 Id. at 813-14.
58 Id. at 808 (first and second alterations in original) (citation omitted).
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political gerrymander . . . ."'59 The motives of those responsible for
drawing the map were never much in question.
Nor was the mechanism by which the mapdrawers secured the
intended effect:
The Republican-controlled North Carolina General
Assembly expressly directed the legislators and
consultant responsible for drawing the 2016 Plan to rely
on "political data"-past election results specifying
whether, and to what extent, particular voting districts
had favored Republican or Democratic candidates, and
therefore were likely to do so in the future-to draw a
districting plan that would ensure Republican
candidates would prevail in the vast majority of the
60
state's congressional districts.
As applied to plaintiffs' First Amendment claims, the district
court found ample evidence to support its finding that "[t]he 2016
Plan discriminate[d] against a particular viewpoint: voters who
oppose the Republican platform and Republican candidates. The
2016 Plan also discriminates against a particular group of speakers:
non-Republican candidates and voters who support non-Republican
61
candidates."
Further, the district court determined there was little lingering
question regarding the extent of the burden imposed in violation of
those First Amendment rights: "[T]he 2016 Plan... 'adversely
affected' such voters' First Amendment rights by diluting the
electoral power of their votes."62 The evidence showed:
[T]he 2016 Plano . . . had the effect of chilling the political

speech and associational rights of individuals and entities that
support non-Republican candidates[,] ... adversely affected

such individuals' and entities' First Amendment rights by
diluting the electoral speech and power of voters who support

59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.

(second and fifth alterations in original) (citations omitted).
at 800 (citation omitted).
at 927.
at 933 (citing Shapiro v. McManus, 203 F. Supp. 3d 579, 597-98 (D. Md. 2016)).

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol52/iss4/3

14

Bondurant and Thorpe: The First Amendment Case Against Partisan Gerrymandering

2018]

THE FIRST AMENDMENT CASE

1053

non-Republican candidates[, and] ...burdened their political
63
speech and associational rights."
The district court's legal analysis then flowed logically from these
factual findings. "Partisan gerrymandering-[defined as] 'the
drawing of legislative district lines to subordinate adherents of one
political party and entrench a rival party in power,' implicates First
Amendment rights because 'political belief and association
constitute the core of those activities protected by the First
By "favoring one set of political beliefs over
Amendment."'
another," partisan gerrymanders may constitute viewpoint
The district court determined, based on the
discrimination. 65
largely uncontested factual record, that the 2016 Plan did precisely
that. 66 Further, the district court held that, "by seeking to dilute
the electoral speech of supporters of disfavored parties or
candidates, partisan gerrymandering runs afoul of the First
Amendment's prohibition on laws that disfavor a particular group
or class of speakers. ' 67 Separately, the district court held that the
2016 Plan, "by disfavoring a group of voters based on their prior
votes and political association... [violated] the First Amendment's
prohibition on burdening or penalizing individuals for engaging in
protected speech." 68 And finally, the district court held that the
2016 Plan violated basic principles regarding the neutrality of
election regulations and accordingly infringed on plaintiffs' freedom
69
of association.
Nonetheless, the district court acknowledged that the Supreme
Court has yet to finally determine a rubric for evaluating partisan
gerrymandering claims under the First Amendment.70 After noting
that certain features of First Amendment law (particularly
regarding viewpoint discrimination and the intended neutrality of
election regulations) appear difficult to square with a required

6

Id. at 934-35.

64 Id. at 924 (first quoting Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n,

135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658 (2015); then quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 356 (1976)).
65 Id. (citing Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995);
then citing Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 314 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
66 Id. at 927.
67 Id. at 924 (citing Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010)).
68 Id. at 925 (citing Vieth, 541 U.S. at 314 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
69 Id. at.
70 Id. at 928.
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showing of effect, the district court nonetheless adopted a slightlyheightened standard in anticipation of Supreme Court review.7 1
The district court applied that scrutiny through a new test:
We derive a three-prong test requiring Plaintiffs to
prove: (1) that the challenged districting plan was
intended to favor or disfavor individuals or entities that
support a particular candidate or political party, (2)
that the districting plan burdened the political speech
or associational rights of such individuals or entities,
and (3) that a causal relationship existed between the
governmental actor's discriminatory motivation and the
First Amendment burdens imposed by the districting
72
plan.
Given the evidence outlined above, the district court easily
determined "that Plaintiffs satisfied their burden to demonstrate
that the General Assembly intended to burden the speech and
73
associational rights of such entities and voters."
Similarly, the district court found that a number of demonstrated
"chilling effects on speech and association-difficulty convincing
voters to participate in the political process and vote, attracting
strong candidates, raising money to support such candidates, and
influencing elected officials-represent[ed]
cognizable, and
recognized, burdens on First Amendment rights."74 Beyond those
tangible effects isolated in the district court's opinion, it further
found that plaintiffs' First Amendment rights were burdened
75
because the 2016 Plan diluted the electoral power of their votes.
"The principle that vote dilution-the intentional diminishment of
the electoral power of supporters of a disfavored party and
enhancement of the electoral power of supporters of a favored
party-constitutes an actionable adverse effect on political speech
and associational rights derives from bedrock First Amendment
principles." 76 Finally, the district court found that the plaintiffs
71 See id. at 929 (determining that intermediate scrutiny should apply to the 2016 Plan).
72 Id. at 929.

13
74
75
76

Id. at 930.
Id. at 931 (citations omitted).
Id. at 933 (citing Shapiro v. McManus, 203 F. Supp. 3d 579, 597-98 (D. Md. 2016)).
Id. The Court added: "[T]he concept that government may restrict the speech of some
elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the
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satisfied the causation inquiry: "[T]he General Assembly's
discriminatory animus against non-Republican voters, candidates,
and parties caused the 2016 Plan's burdens on such voters,
77
candidates, and parties' political speech and associational rights."
Accordingly, the district court found that the plaintiffs had satisfied
the three-part test it set forth and that the 2016 Plan violated the
78
First Amendment.
IV. CONCLUSION

As the district court decision in Common Cause v. Rucho amply
demonstrates, the standards by which to evaluate claims of
unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering under the First
Amendment are predictable and well-defined. Justice Kennedy's
intuition that "[t]he First Amendment may be the more relevant
constitutional provision in future cases that allege unconstitutional
partisan gerrymandering 79 shows great foresight.
The Supreme Court's recent First Amendment jurisprudence
demonstrates an ongoing commitment to the protection of speech
and a persistent aversion to governmental control over or
manipulation of protected expression. Yet that is precisely what
courts-like the district court in North Carolina-now find when
evaluating these claims. Government officials-beholden to their
own political party affiliations-brazenly use their delegated power
to place a heavy thumb on the scales in favor of the ruling party.
The First Amendment remains the strongest defense against a
practice so incompatible with the democratic principles on which
our very structure of government survives.

First Amendment." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49
(1976)).
77 Id. at 935.
78 Id.
79 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 276, 314 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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